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I estimate a model in which new technology entails random adjustment costs. Rapid adjustments
may cause productivity slowdowns. These slowdowns last longer when retooling is costly. The
model explains why growth-rate disasters are more likely than miracles, and why volatility of
growth relates negatively to growth over time. I estimate the model, and the estimates have
surprising implications. Firms seem to abandon technologies long before they are perfected –











I estimate a model in which new technology entails random adjustment
costs. Rapid adjustments may cause productivity slowdowns. These slow-
downs last longer when retooling is costly. The model explains why growth-
rate disasters are more likely than miracles, and why volatilityo fg r o w t hr e l a t e s
negatively to growth over time. I estimate the model, and the estimates have
surprising implications. Firms seem to abandon technologies long before they
are perfected — current-practice TFP is 17 percent below best-practice.
1 Introduction
Technology shocks play a central role in most business cycle models of the last two
decades. We often take such shocks as exogenous and we then study how a model
economy responds to them. The present paper starts from the premise that the
shocks depend on the technologies we adopt. I study technology adoption in an “Ak”
growth model with endogenous shocks that can explain a few business-cycle facts. I
assume that a technology requires speciﬁc skills. The exact nature of these skills is
not known before a technology is adopted. Having committed to a technology, ﬁrms
may face unexpectedly large training costs.
The model generates left-skewed distributions for the growth rates of output,
consumption, investment, stock prices, and interest rates. Such skewness is seen in
U.S. and other data. The growth process obeys a simple diﬀerence equation and I
provide estimates of the model’s parameters. The model also generates growth-rates
that are more volatile in recessions than in booms. This explains the time-series
ﬁndings of Ramey and Ramey (1991) which I have updated.
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1Technological adoption entails free riding incentives analyzed at the industry level
by Jovanovic and Lach (1999) and at the aggregate level by Eeckhout and Jovanovic
(2002). To keep things tractable here, however, I assume that technological informa-
tion is of transitory value so that a ﬁrm chooses the same technology that all others
have chosen. In spite of this, adjustment costs — incurred simultaneously by all ﬁrms —
play a role similar to diﬀusion lags and they deliver impulse responses similar to those
Lippi and Reichlin (1994) and Forni and Reichlin (1998) report as being induced by
diﬀusion lags.
The parameter estimates imply that ﬁrms abandon technologies long before they
are perfected. Current-practice TFP is 17 percent below best-practice TFP.
Plan of paper.–Section 2 starts with a sketch of the quantitative puzzle and the
intuition. Section 3 presents the model and compares it to some evidence. Section 4
discusses the literature and Section 5 concludes.
2 Intuitive explanation
The model assumes technological commitment and random adoption costs. The fol-
lowing example shows the intuition behind asymmetric growth rates and sluggish
responses to technology. In Figure 1, the vertical axis plots the log of TFP. For






where sA is the ideal skill-mix for technology A and where h is the actual skill mix
which we measure on the horizontal axis. Committing to a potential TFP-growth
rate of x exposes the adopter to uncertainty about sA+x. The law of motion for s is
sA+x = sA + xε,
and ε is unknown until after the commitment to technology A+x is made. The new
log TFP level would then be A + x − λ
2 (sA + xε − h)
2. Suppose, however, that we
start with an initial level of expertise that is ideal for technology A. That is, suppose
h = sA. Then the new log TFP would be






as illustrated in Figure 1. A large |ε| produces a growth disaster, whereas a miracle
is impossible because the largest possible TFP is A + x.
Diﬀusion lags, learning, and slow adjustment of h.–In the model ﬁrms all choose
t h es a m et e c h n o l o g yA. This violates the tendency for a technology to spread only
gradually among adopters. E.g., Lippi and Reichlin (1994), Jovanovic and Lach
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Figure 1: Asymmetric growth and the impulse response of technology
shocks
sluggish impulse responses to technology shocks. Yet sluggishness in h within each
ﬁrm can deliver a similar impulse response. We may think of h as organization capital
that the ﬁrm owns and that is costly to adjust, as Prescott and Visscher (1980) argue.
To see why, suppose a ﬁrm starts with expertise h = sA, so that its initial TFP is
A. Suppose it then permanently switches to technology A + x. It turns out that ht
follows a partial adjustment path from h towards sA+x:
ht+1 = αht +( 1− α)sA+x, where h0 = sA







= sA+x + α
txε
so that






In other words lnTFP converges geometrically to its new high. The bottom panel
of Figure 1 shows the typical impulse response of ε.
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The model has two types of capital. The ﬁrst, k, is the quantity of capital. The
second, h, is a non-hierarchical index of expertise and physical-capital type, which I
think of as the skill mix.
Production function.–With k units of capital, ﬁrm has a potential output of
y
p = zk.
The productivity parameter, z, is endogenous and given by










Here A is the ﬁrm’s technology, h0 is the ﬁrm’s skill mix, and sA is the skill-mix ideal
for technology A. The cost of technological imbalance is indexed by λ>0.
Adoption of technology.–Adoption of a better technology is free. A ﬁrm can
choose a technology level by any amount, x,s ot h a ts t a r t i n gt o d a ya tA, tomorrow’s
technology is
A
0 = A(1 − δ)+x. (2)
where δA represents obsolescence. The ﬁrm commits to using technology A for at
least one period. But A0 makes unpredictable demands on the skill mix. Assume that
sA0 = sA + xε, (3)
where ε is a zero-mean random variable with variance σ2.T h ep a r a m e t e rε is time
speciﬁc. The ﬁrm chooses x before seeing ε. Assume x ≥ 0. I.e., once abandoned, a
technology cannot be recalled.
Adjustment of h.–The ﬁrm starts with skill mix h. Before producing, it can
















The cost of redressing technological imbalance is indexed by θ>0.I r e f e r t o t h i s
loosely as a retooling cost.
The ﬁrm’s decision problem.–Firms will choose their x and h0 so as to maximize
the productivity of the capital that they raised in the previous period. A ﬁrm produces
for one period and then liquidates. In the pre-pre-production period it
1. raises capital k from shareholders,
2. chooses x which commits it to using technology A0 as given by (2),
43. freely inherits the prevailing skill mix h.
In the production period the ﬁrm does the following in sequence: It
1. observes sA0 as given by (3),
2. chooses h0,
3. produces and pays a dividend
y = y
p − C (y
p,h,h
0)
4. liquidates; the salvage value of its k and h0 is zero.
Choice of h0.–Suppose that (having committed to A0 in the previous period) at
the start of the production period the ﬁrm has observed that sA0 = s0.T h eﬁrm then
chooses h0 to solve
max
h0 {y



















The ﬁrst-order condition is λ(s0 − h0)−θ(h0 − h)=0and at its solution, the second-
order derivative w.r.t. h0 is negative. The optimal h0 is a convex combination of
starting skill mix h, and ideal skill mix s0:
h







Substituting into (4), its maximized value is the ﬁrm’s output:

















is the average product of capital, or maximized TFP, which depends only on s0 − h,
the “skill-mix gap” that exists at the start of the production period, after s0 has been
drawn, but before the ﬁrm has adjusted h.
The choice of x.–The ﬁrm chooses its technology in the pre-production period,
before knowing s0. The state-of-the-art technology is summarized by the pair (A,s),
and the skill mix is h. All ﬁrms face the same shock ε and so tomorrow’s aggregate
output and consumption will depend on ε.A l lﬁrms will choose the same (x,h0) pair.
This means that the ﬁrm’s dividend will be correlated with tomorrow’s aggregate
5consumption. Let p(A,ε) be today’s price of a unit of consumption tomorrow if the




Z ([1 − δ]A + x∗,s+ x∗ε − h)
(8)
The optimal x maximizes the pre-production value of the ﬁrm per unit of k raised.





p(A,ε)Z ([1 − δ]A + x,s + xε − h)dF (ε) (9)
=1 .
The amount the market is willing to pay for a claim to the ﬁrm’s dividend in the
next period is v(A,s − h), which must equal unity because cost of capital is 1.A t
this price and value, a ﬁrm breaks even on each unit of k that it raises.
As (9) shows, ﬁrms’ choices of x are interdependent. To ﬁnd the equilibrium choice
of x we now diﬀerentiate the RHS of (9) w.r.t. x in and substituting from (8) into
the resulting expression. We then evaluate the FOC at the symmetric equilibrium
x = x∗,a n do b t a i n Z
[1 − λαε(s + xε − h)]dF (ε)=0 .
Since ε has mean zero and variance σ2,a n ds i n c e(x,s,h) are predetermined, this














where the second equality follows from the (6). Now we see clearly what the barriers
to technological adoption are. If λ or θ or σ2 were zero, x would be inﬁnite.






Asset markets. – T h en u m b e ro fh o u s e h o l d sa n dt h en u m b e ro fﬁrms are both nor-
malized to unity. This double normalization is ﬁne because ﬁrm-size is indeterminate.
Then y and k are output and capital per consumer. A household owns one-period
shares of ﬁrms, and dividends are its only income. Because the representative ﬁrm
grows over time, let us deﬁne shares in terms of pieces of capital rather than of ﬁrms.
That is, let n be the number of units of capital that the household owns. From (9),
the price of a share is unity.
6The behavior of the aggregate state.–The pricing of assets will not depend on the
capital stock so that for the consumer’s savings problem, at least, the aggregate state
will be (A,s,h−1).L e t u = s − h−1. From (7) it follows that (s,h−1) matters for
aggregate output only through u.W es h a l ls h o wt h a tu follows the Markov process
u
0 = αu + xε,








where F is the C.D.F. of ε.
The savings decision.–If it owns n shares, a household’s wealth is Z (A,u)n.I t s
budget constraint therefore is
n
0 + c = Z (A,u)n. (12)




ln(Z (A,u)n − n
0)+β
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The ﬁrst appendix shows that optimal consumption is





n = k. (15)





















Figure 2: Determination of A∗
3.1 The growth process
Since x is a constant, At converges monotonically to A∗ that uniquely solves
x = δA, (17)
as shown in Figure (2).In RBC analysis we often treat the technology parameter as
stationary, and I shall do the same and assume that A is at A∗.
I will also assume that the costs of adjusting h consist entirely of foregone output.
Measured output then is
y = Z (A
∗,u)k.
Then (4) implies
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= ψ0 +l ny−1 − ψu
2
where






The second line of (18) follows because (14) and (15) imply that k = βy−1, and upon
applying (5) and the deﬁnition u ≡ s − h−1.T h u sl e t t i n g∆lnyt ≡ lnyt+1 − lnyt,
∆lnyt = ψ0 − ψu
2
t+1. (17)
8Long-run growth. – T h el o n g - r u n - a v e r a g eg r o w t hr a t eo fo u t p u ti sg o t t e nb yt a k i n g
the unconditional expectation in (17) which leads to the following result (proved in
the appendix):
Proposition 1 The long-run growth rate has a mean of


























Long-run growth increases with β, and decreases with α,λ,a n dσ2.
The process for u.–From (5), h0 = αh +( 1− α)s0, so that
u
0 = s
0 − h = s + xε − αh−1 − (1 − α)s = α(s − h−1)+xε.
Since ε is independent of u we adopt the convention of dating it at t +1and we
therefore have the time-series process
ut+1 = αut + xεt+1. (20)
T h ec a s ew h e r eε is normally distributed.–If εt is normally distributed, the sta-





1 − α2. (21)
Now, the stationary distribution of the square of a standard normal variate, is χ2
(1).























for v ≥ 0.
9Figure 3: χ2 distribution of ∆lny when ε is normal.
F i g u r e3s h o w st h el o n g - r u nd i s t r i b u t i o no fo u t p u tg r o w t h( g i v e ni n[ 1 7 ] ) . I ti s
also distributed χ2
1, except that the tail is on the left. Output growth is negative if
u2
t >ψ 0/ψ. And why is ut missing in (17)? It is because savings exactly oﬀset the
inﬂuence of ut: Savings are proportional to yt so that ﬂuctuations in yt do not aﬀect
the growth rate — a drop in yt simply translates into an equal percentage drop in kt+1.
On the other hand, ﬂuctuations in yt+1 do get into the growth rate between t and
t+1, and the distribution of the level yt+1 is skewed to the left. Hence the asymmetry
i nt h eg r o w t hr a t eo fy. This asymmetry should also show up in consumption and
investment growth.
The distribution of growth rates in U.S. GDP per capita.–The top panels of Figure
4 show the frequency distribution of growth rates of per-capita output at a ﬁve-year
frequency. The labeling refers to the last year of a ﬁve-year interval so, for example,
the growth rate for 1940 means lny1940 − lny1935. With the three observations the
three wars (Civil 1860-65, WW1 1915-20, WW2 1940-45) taken out, the numbers are
decidedly skewed to the left. Omitted were those 5-year intervals that most naturally
contain the most intense war-time years). The two histograms look a little diﬀerent
because the number of bins in both histograms is the same — 25 bins. As a result,
bin size is slightly diﬀerent and, hence, the 2 left-most observations are paired in the
right histograms and not paired in the left one. The kernel density estimates are also
reported in the bottom panels.
The distribution of conditional TFP levels in U.S. plants.–TFP levels are non-
stationary, but their distribution conditional on lagged values should also be skewed
to the left. Now, in the model ﬁrms are identical, and each uses the same technology.
10Figure 4: Distributions of ﬁve-year growth rates with and without wars
In fact, however, while technology has an aggregate component, there also are ﬁrm-
speciﬁc technological diﬀerences. Stretching the model somewhat, we may thus look
for a left skew in the distribution of ﬁrm-level TFP. Such asymmetries have been
found in the frontier-production-function literature (Caves and Barton, 1990). Figure
reproduces the results reported in Figure 2 of Baily Hulten and Campbell (1993). The
six histograms pertain to plants’ TFP levels in 1987 conditional on their values in
1982. Each histogram pertains to a separate productivity range in 1982. In other
words there are six conditioning sets in 1982, and the sets are monotonically increasing
as we move down and to the right in the panel. The means rise monotonically, which
implies that TFP levels are positively autocorrelated








11Figure 5: Conditional distributions of plant TFP
3.2 Growth and retooling
Recessions are retooling episodes here in the sense that h adjusts most when output








r =1− exp{(1 − α)(∆lnyt − ψ0)} (24)
























































Costs of adjusting h as a percentage of output
The costs of growth are in the form of lower output due to the adjustment of
h. These costs depend mainly on α. T h ea b o v eF i g u r ep l o t st h er e l a t i o ni n( 2 4 )
evaluated at the estimated parameter values (5 yrs no war) in column 4 of the Table
of estimates below: α =0 .6 and ψ0 =0 .05 (the annualized value of ˆ ψ0).
3.3 Growth vs. volatility of ∆yt over time
When θ>0, and hence when α>0, the model predicts a negative correlation between
output growth and output-growth variability over time. This is seen intuitively in
Figure 3. The conditional variance is higher if we know that ∆lny is likely to be
low. The latter, in turn, follows because u us autocorrelated – when u strays far
from the origin, it will probably remain far from the origin in the next period as well.
Conditional on u, this implies lower expected growth but, because u2 is an increasing
and convex function of |u|, it also implies a higher variance of growth. Formally,
Proposition 3 The time-series relation between growth and its variability is nega-
tive.
Proof. In (17) we condition the mean and variance of ∆lnyt on the lagged value
of u,i . e . ,o nut.A sut varies over time, the conditional mean and variance of ∆lnyt
shift. Showing that the two move in opposite ways when ut shifts is equivalent to
showing that the conditional mean and conditional variance of u2
t+1 move in the same
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4 +3[ Va r(ut+1 | u)]
2 +6[ E (ut+1 | u)]








Thus, as long as α>0, the mean and variance of u2 are both increasing in lagged
u2.
Figures 4 and 5 report the relation between mean and variance of growth at 5-
year and 10-year frequencies. Wartime observations are denoted by hollow squares.
A negative relation emerges for 5-year intervals with and without wars. For decades,
the relation is negative only if we exclude wars. Generally, decades do not support
the model well as 5-year periods and there are fewer observations at that frequency.
Figure A1 of the appendix reports the entire growth-rate series in decade and 5-
year form, along with the standard deviations.2The negative time-series relation is
conﬁrmed in Figures 7 and 8 of Ramey and Ramey (1991) for annual data.
The trade-oﬀ between growth and its variability is an equilibrium relation, how-
ever, and not one that policy can exploit. Raising x would raise volatility, and raising
the savings rate would leave volatility unchanged.
3.3.1 The cross-section relation between growth and its variance.
As it stands the model has only one sector. It does not explain cross-section facts.
But as I argued in Section 2.1, when ﬁrms use diﬀerent technologies the model would
lead us to expect that the cross-section distributions of plants’ TFP should be skewed
to the left. And the logic of the preceding proposition leads one to expect that, plants
with low-TFP last period should have a greater variance of TFP this period. This
was true in the Baily et al (1993) sample, as Table 1 and Figure 8 show, though one
cannot make much of just six observations.
Less favorable is the cross-sector evidence. Imbs (2002) ﬁnds that the cross-
sector correlation between growth and volatility is positive. This could happen in
the model if technological opportunity, as expressed, e.g., in the parameter λ,w e r e
to vary over sectors. For instance, (10) implies that a fall in λ raises x and it raises
volatility of output so that growth and volatility both rise Imbs also ﬁnds that the
correlation remains substantial even after controlling for investment, suggesting that
the explanation is technological, such as the one advanced here.
2The statistical program used required the shading of the wars to be shifted to the left by 2.5
years.
14Figure 6: The five-year-interval sample
Figure 7: The Decades Sample
15Figure 8: Mean vs. variance in the distribution of plant TFP
3.4 Estimates of the parameters
I shall use per-capita GDP data from 1790 until the present. This model is bet-
ter suited to low frequencies because ﬁrms choose their technologies relatively infre-
quently. We need a long time series, at least while we deal with one country only.
The 4 parameters are ψ0,λ,θ,and σ2, but not all 4 are identiﬁed:






Proof. The expressions in (6) and (10) do not change. From (21) the variance
of u is proportional to σ2, so that the distribution of u/σ is invariant to changes
in σ. Therefore the variance of ψu2 is of order ψ
2σ4 =( ψσ2)
2. But from (19), ψ
is homogeneous of degree 1 in (λ,θ), and this implies that the distribution of ψu2
depends only on (λσ2,θσ2).
In other words, if we double the penalties λ and θ b u th a l v et h ev a r i a n c eσ2 of the




I ﬁt the model to both 5-year and 10-year frequencies. With its assumption of
100% depreciation of k, the model seems inappropriate for frequencies higher than
16that. The estimates come from data on per-capita GDP since 1790, and no other
series were used. The estimates are reported in Table 1.
Let us concentrate on the last column, the ﬁve-year intervals excluding wars. The
estimates of α = θ/(λ + θ) range between 0.52 and 0.68.
Table 1: Parameter estimates, 5-year and 10-year periods: 1790-2000






































































From (17), ∆lnyt = ψ0−ψu2
t+1. Conditional on u, then, the percentage by which
output is reduced by technological imbalance is ψu2
t+1.S i n c e ψ = 1
2λα and since,
by (21), under the steady state distribution of uE u 2 = x2/(1 − α2), (recall that we













Therefore the level of output is 17 percent below its maximal level — i.e., the level that
would result if the technologies in question were operated at their maximal eﬃciency.
From this it follows that a rise in technological uncertainty (e.g., in σ which is
being held at unity in the above calculations) will give rise to lower growth as well
as a lower level. Comin (2000) argued that the productivity slowdown of the 70s and
8 0 sw a st h er e s u l to far i s ei nt e c h n o l o g i c a lu n c e r t a i n t yi nt h e1 9 7 0 ’ sw h i c hr a i s e dt h e
demand for less productive but more ﬂexible capital. I get a similar eﬀect from a rise
in σ2 that reduces x and, hence, TFP.
174 Related theory
With so much written on the subject it helps to group the papers by topic. Any model
that delivers sharper downturns than recoveries is related to the present model. There
many such models.
Exogenous shocks and growth.–Jones, Manuelli and Stacchetti (1999) and Fatas
(2000) study how the shock process to productivity inﬂuences growth, and Scott and
Uhlig (1999) study the growth eﬀects of a change in the volatility of investment.
Acemoglu and Scott (1997) look at level eﬀects in a model with dynamic increasing
returns and show asymmetries
Adoption and free riding.–Chamley and Gale (1993) and Caplin and Leahy (1994)
focus on incentives to delay adoption. Chalkley and Lee (1998) and Veldcamp (2002)
argue cycles are asymmetric because ﬁrms can more quickly detect negative shocks
than positive ones.
Endogenous technology and cycles.–Greenwood, Hercowitz and Huﬀman (1988)
allow shocks to the marginal eﬃciency of investment, while Aghion and Howitt (1992),
Barlevy (2002) and Comin and Gertler (2003) model technology as a random function
of research. Martin and Rogers (2000) relate learning by doing to growth and its
volatility.
Costs of business cycles.–Lucas (1987) argued the getting rid of cycles would
yield tiny beneﬁts. But when cycles are related to trend as is the case in Benhabib
and Nishimura (1984), Shleifer (1986), Matsuyama (1999) and Ellis and Francois
(2001), the question is not well posed. Caballero and Hammour (1994) argue that
recessions are reallocative, for reasons similar to those I have modelled. Other related
papers are Barlevy (2001), Krebs (2002), and Rampini and Eisfeldt (2003).
My defense for adding yet another modelt ot h i sl o n gl i s ti st h a tIs o l v ef o r
everything analytically.
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has explained a couple of business-cycle regularities. The left-skewed
distribution of growth rates and the negative time-series relation between growth
rates and their variance. It seems that ﬁrms abandon technologies long before they
are perfected — current-practice TFP is 17 percent below best-practice.
The policy implication is certainly not that business cycles should be stabilized.
Rather, the opposite is true, in the sense that technological adoption — and hence
technological risk — are too low. Because the model assumes that there are inter-
generational spillovers in technology and expertise, both sorts of investments are
likely, in equilibrium, to be below their socially optimal levels.
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6 Appendix
Several arguments are listed in separate Appendixes.
6.1 The proof of Proposition 1


























t+1 +2 αxεt+1ut. (28)
21Then since εt+1 and ut are uncorrelated, since Va r(ε2)=2 σ4,s i n c eVa r(εt+1ut)=
σ2σ2
u and since σ2
















from which the claim follows















































From (19) and (10), ψ = 1
2λα = 1










































To estimate ψ0 deﬁned in (19) we use the consistent estimate
ˆ ψ0 =m a x
t ∆lnyt. (29)
For the other parameters we proceed as follows: (17) says that


















∆logyt − ψ0 = α

























































Therefore the expectation of the OLS estimate ˆ α































































so that OLS estimates are biased upward.
For the second restriction on moments,
−ψ =








2¢ E (∆logyt) − ψ0
x2σ2 .
From (19) and (10) ψ = 1
2λα = 1





























(∆logyt − ψ0)=0 .




23where ˆ m(β) is the empirical counterpart of m(α,λ) and W−1 is the optimal weighting















where β =0 .95 and T =5or T =1 0 , depending on whether the time-interval is ﬁve
or ten years. Table 1 reports the estimates.
6.3 Derivation of optimal savings
L e tu sn o wa n a l y z et h es a v i n g sp r o b l e md e ﬁned in (13) and derive the optimal con-
sumption rule expressed in (14). To save space I do it only under the assumption
that A = A∗ so that we can drop A from the vector of states.






W (u)=m a x
ξ
½









Proof. We can change variables and let ξ = n0/n so that substituting into the










=l n n + β [B lnn]+m a x
ξ
½







i.e., if B =1 /(1 − β). Since the right hand side is a contraction operator on a
complete metric space, there exists exactly one function W (u) such that (32 holds.










Proposition 7 Optimal consumption is




= Z − ξ. (34)
Since shares are one-period, consumer wealth is the same as aggregate output. We
posit consumption to be a constant fraction of wealth
c = ωZn,
Together with (34) this implies
ξ = Z −
c
n
= Z (1 − ω).
Substituting for ξ into (33), we ﬁnd that it holds if and only if
ω =1− β.
25